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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the motivations behind Malaysia’s national language policy in theoretical terms 
to allow the Malaysian narrative to be positioned in an international context. To do this, it applies 
Spolsky’s (2004) theory of what influences language policy making in contemporary nation-states, 
namely national ideology, the role of English in globalisation era, the nation’s sociolinguistic situation, 
and an interest in linguistic minority rights. The paper argues that all factors are relevant in the 
Malaysian context. However, the domestic sociolinguistic situation only influences policy in so far as 
Malaysia’s response to its ethnolinguistic minorities is limited to minimal linguistic rights in the 
education system. This limited acceptance of linguistic diversity continues a tradition of protecting what 
Malaysian law sees as the supremacy of Malay culture and language. The paper concludes with an 
invitation to apply this theory in the study of other nations in the region to foster a robust body of 
comparative data on national language policies in Southeast Asia. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Nation-building processes call on governments and its populations to both define the linguistic 
character of their nation-states and to manage ethnolinguistic diversity, and for Malaysia this 
remains a central policy concern. Malaysia would, under current sociolinguistic thinking, be 
termed superdiverse (Blommaert & Rampton, 2012) in that the convergence of ethnicities, 
languages, and religions on the Malaysia peninsula and in the states of Sarawak and Sabah on 
the Borneo Island have rendered Malaysia a complex melange of ethnolinguistic traditions and 
interests. The Malay form only a narrow majority against the country’s ethnic Chinese and 
Indian communities, and their majority status is not evenly distributed across Malaysia. 
Furthermore, contemporary Malaysian citizenship has generally not resulted in minorities 
shifting from their heritage languages to Bahasa Melayu as the majority language and language 
of administration because ethnic belonging remains central to self-identification in Malaysia 
(Frith, 2000). Instead, Malaysia is ethnolinguistically dynamic, with its many communities 
holding to their traditions, cultures and languages. In complicating this picture, British 
colonialism cemented a role for the English language. However, beyond being an 
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uncomfortable reminder of imperialism, English is also primarily the language of Malaysia’s 
open, thriving, and highly internationalised economy. This superdiversity, while attractive in 
concept, has also been viewed as problematic since Malaysia attained independence from the 
British Empire in 1957 and embarked on an ambitious project to define Malaysia and propose 
effective language policy that would unite the polity. 
 
Language policy and planning in Malaysia has attracted scholarly interest to trace the 
Malaysian socio-political environment vis-à-vis linguistic diversity and to account for language 
policies that have been implemented to regulate diversity. Important overviews of the language 
policy timeline have been provided by the works of David & Govindasamy (2005), Gill (2013), 
Mauzy (1985), and Noor & Leong (2013) among others. These have shown Malaysia fervently 
instituting Bahasa Melayu, the language of the Malay Muslim majority, as the national 
language for all Malaysians, including the Chinese, Indian, and indigenous minorities. They 
have also examined Malaysia’s vexed relationship with the English language including how 
Malaysia has continued to reposition its role in the Malaysian education system, as well as 
debates about the desirability of English as a lingua franca instead of, or parallel to, Bahasa 
Melayu. This means that important scholarship has already traversed Malaysia’s political 
history on language. This paper, however, seeks to contextualise Malaysian language policy 
by examining it in theoretical terms. To do this, the paper reviews Malaysia’s language policy 
in respect to what Spolsky (2004), as modified by Albury (2015), sees as the four drivers behind 
the language policies instituted by contemporary nation states. Under this theory, government 
language policy today is informed, to some interrelated degree, by national ideology and 
identity, the prominence of English as the language of globalisation, the domestic 
sociolinguistic situation of the country, and an increasing pressure from the international arena 
to offer language rights to ethnolinguistic minorities and promote linguistic diversity. This 
paper analyses to what extent and how these factors have motivated the Malaysian 
government’s language policies since the country’s independence in 1957.  
 
This means the analysis allows official Malaysian language policy to be understood in 
theoretical terms comparable to those used to examine the motivations and forces behind 
government language policy in other international studies. Spolsky (2004) himself has offered 
a high-level application of his own theory while discussing its relevance and called for it to be 
tested further. Albury (2015) accepted this invitation and tested the theory for its adequacy in 
accounting for the forces behind protectionist language policy in Iceland. In other work, Wright 
(2003) has discussed nationalism, nation-building, and globalisation as influences that drive 
the government language policies. May (2011) discusses ethnicity and nationalism in language 
policy, and earlier work from Fishman (1971) theorised the role of national legacies and 
traditions in newly formed nation-states. Thus, this paper serves on one hand to offer Malaysia 
as a case study for exploring and applying Spolsky’s national language policy theory where it 
has not yet been tested. On the other hand, the findings of the paper allow the Malaysian 
language policy narrative to be framed in established theoretical terms so that the analysis can 
contribute to the body of theoretical work on why nation-states institute their language policies, 
by default offering the Malaysian context as a reference for comparative studies and theorists.  
2.0 A THEORY OF NATIONAL LANGUAGE POLICY 
The postmodern turn in language policy scholarship has broadened the scope of language 
policy inquiry to include governmentality and language regulation as it occurs outside the 
corridors of political power (Pennycook, 2006). That is to say, scholarship agrees that language 
policy agents are now vast and many as language policy is interpreted, created, and 
implemented across the many layers of society by many social actors. Therefore, Hornberger 
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and Johnson (2007) have conceptualised language policy as a multi-layered onion where the 
various layers of the onion represent various levels in society from government to the 
individual who are dynamically interconnected in language policy processes and engage in 
language policy as policy implementers and makers. Other work has specifically emphasised 
ethnography as a tool from linguistic anthropology to investigate localised language policy 
situations as they manifest through social relations, such as those in classrooms or businesses 
where language or linguistic diversity is in some way, managed explicitly and implicitly 
(Blommaert & Jie, 2010; Canagarajah, 2006; Johnson, 2009). The expanding field of family 
language policy focuses on how linguistic diversity is fostered, hindered, or otherwise managed 
in domiciles with the view that families are crucial agents in determining ethnolinguistic 
vitality, especially amongst minority groups. The notion here is that families strategise how to 
manage language in multilingual homes.  
 
These postmodern perspectives adhere to progressive definitions of what counts as 
language policy. They accept, for example, that language policy need not solely be official 
documents or rules created by an authority. Instead, language policy may be implicit modus 
operandi or unspoken rules that are culturally determined and socially applicable but operate 
like de facto policy. As Schiffman (2006) explains, each language policy situation is unique 
and is born out of its community’s own linguistic culture whereby language policy may reside 
in the norms and practices that simply are the ways things are for a certain community based 
on local preferences, ontology and epistemology. By giving agency to many actors across 
society, language policy scholarship therefore accepts that language attitudes and ideologies 
play a crucial role in language policy processes (Cameron, 2006; Spolsky, 2004). Parents, 
teachers, sporting groups, religious groups and governments bring convictions and dispositions 
about language to their language policy activities in order to advance a particular language 
outcome. For example, some languages may be valued more than others in local contexts, and 
policy makers respond to such beliefs. This is however, often cyclical as policy making (where 
languages are valued or stratified) creates or sustains linguistic hierarchies, marginalisation, 
and prestige. 
 
Amidst this theorising of what counts as language policy and who does it, the role of 
government as a pertinent policy maker now appears to be often overlooked. As Albury (2015: 
4) has argued, because scholarship considers that “the real language policy situation of a 
community is realised via the multitude of actors, contexts, processes, interpretations, 
negations and contestations,” a focus on national language policy theory to the exclusion of 
grassroots policy processes “is not without challenges.” However, this does not remove the 
impetus to examine government policies. Governments, equipped with both ideologies and 
budgets, determine, potentially through non-democratic and less than transparent processes, 
what language rights linguistic minorities will enjoy and in what form. They decide what 
language citizens will use with their public authorities. They determine what language school 
curricula may be taught in, and they decide what languages may be taught as a second language. 
They can even manage a language’s corpus and standardise it, or impose language tests on 
young children to ensure their populace is proficient in a society’s dominant language as has 
been the case in Denmark. The power of governments to establish core ideological, legislative, 
and policy frameworks within which societies must operate should not be overlooked. While 
grassroots language policy research is no doubt valid and important, this nonetheless occurs 
within defined jurisdictions. Language policy processes across society must be seen in dynamic 
relationship including in relation to national language policies. This means that examining and 
theorising national language policy remains important scholarship.  
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To this end, Spolsky (2004) has theorised what he sees to be the four key influences 
that determine the language policies of governments in modern nation-states. He claims that 
these influences are: 
 National identity or national ideology. This refers to the beliefs and ideologies of a nation 
that form its collective identity whereby the corresponding languages of those identities 
are being promoted through language policy. This may include a cultural or religious 
identity which is a reminiscent of Fishman’s (1971) discussion on great traditions. An 
example would be that when northern African nations obtained independence from France, 
they referred to their Islamic identities and the tradition of the Qur’an to institute Arabic 
instead of French as the official language in their postcolonial nation-building process.  
 English as the language of globalisation. Proficiency in English has, in most parts of the 
world, become synonymous with economic development in today’s internationalised 
economy. As a result, nation-states respond to English with policy as embracing English 
can create international advantages. Thus, measures such as developing English language 
proficiency in the community in the interest of economic development and international 
connectivity have been taken by many nation-states. However, governments may see the 
rise of English as threatening local identities and may seek to thwart the advancement of 
English into domestic sociolinguistic domains by protecting and promoting the status of 
local languages. This is, what May (2014) describes, a tension between the Global and the 
Local. For example, China embraces English language acquisition by stripping of its 
American or British cultural or ideological context for instrumental purposes (Pan & 
Block, 2011) while New Zealand invests heavily in protecting and reviving the Māori 
language after colonisation in the interests of Indigenous identity and culture in a context 
where English is both one of its national languages and also the global lingua franca 
(Albury, 2016). 
  The domestic sociolinguistic situation. This refers to what languages are spoken within 
the nation-state’s borders. That is to say, policies acknowledge linguistic diversity and 
respond to this either by promoting, tolerating or suppressing it. An example would be  
post-Apartheid South Africa where its plethora of local Indigenous languages have been 
made co-official by law which affords them, in theory, equal status with Afrikaans and 
English (Kamwangamalu, 2000). Indonesia, on the other hand, recognises its massive 
ethnolinguistic diversity but has codified Bahasa Indonesia as the unifying language in its 
nation-building process (Dardjowidjojo, 1998). 
 An interest in affording minority language rights. This refers to an increasing pressure on 
and interest among nation-states to recognise their linguistic minorities and grant them 
linguistic rights. Spolsky (2004) argues that the global civil rights movement inspired by 
American politics and aided by human rights instruments introduced in the 20th century 
have led governments to address the minoritisation of ethnolinguistic groups. Rights may 
be given, for example, through heritage language-medium education or enhanced 
provisions to use a minority language in public office. For example, Norway now allows 
its Indigenous Sámi population some language rights including the right to undertake 
education through a Sámi language and to use Sámi in official business in selected council 
areas in the Sámi homeland (Bull, 2002).  
  
In testing Spolsky’s (2004) theory, Albury (2015) found that language rights have 
influenced language policy making in Iceland, but not as Spolsky envisaged. Instead, Iceland’s 
interests in language rights are self-reflexive and position Icelandic, the majority language as 
a minority requiring protection in the global language ecology, rather than offering, for 
example, language rights to its sizeable Polish population. Accordingly, Albury (2015) argued 
that Spolsky’s theory does not account for non-rights-based approaches to managing language 
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diversity (Réaume & Pinto, 2012: 14). He therefore proposes that instead of this component 
viewing nations as necessarily adopting positive stances on minority rights, it should instead 
be seen as a political domain which nations are increasingly required to engage in some way 
whether the results are permissive or restrictive for the minorities concerned. This amended 
theory now forms the basis for analysing what appears to have driven the Malaysian 
government’s national language policy.  
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
For the context of this paper, language policy is defined as language management as it amounts 
to “explicit and observable efforts by someone or some group that has or claims to have 
authority over the participants in the domain to modify their practices and beliefs” (Spolsky, 
2007: 4). Policy therefore includes laws, regulations, and official programmes. To analyse 
Malaysia’s language policy vis-à-vis Spolsky’s amended theory, a critical desk-top review of 
existing literature was undertaken. This includes both primary and secondary sources on 
Malaysia’s language policy as well as literature from prominent scholars on Malaysia’s 
language policy, sociolinguistics and multiculturalism (see David & Govindasamy, 2005; 
Frith, 2000; Ghazali, 2014; Gill, 2005, 2006, 2013; Gill, 2004; Mauzy, 1985; Noor & Leong, 
2013; Saat, 2012).  
4.0 NATIONAL IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY 
When Malaysia gained its independence from British colonial rule in 1957, a key task in 
language policy was to define Malaysia in linguistic terms as part of the postcolonial nation-
building process. The task was significant because at an intersection of Asian traditions, 
Malaysia (including the states of Sarawak and Sabah on Borneo Island) is ethnolinguistically 
and culturally diverse. The Malays, who are Muslim and speak Bahasa Melayu and its dialects, 
form a small majority. The waves of migration from China and India have established Taoist, 
Buddhist, and Hindu diasporas speaking a range of Chinese and Indian languages, including 
Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Foochow, Teochew, and Mandarin as their lingua franca, as well 
as Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Hindi, and Punjabi. In Sarawak and Sabah, the largely Christian 
and Indigenous majority retain a plethora of local heritage languages including Bidayuh, Iban, 
and Dusun-Kadazan. Today, the nation roughly comprises of 67% Malay and other Bumiputera 
(sons of the soil including Indigenous people in Borneo), 25% Chinese, and 6.8% Indian 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2015).  
 
 In Malaysia, it is only the identity and national ideology of the Malay majority that have 
come to influence national language policy. The languages and cultures of the Chinese, Indian 
and Indigenous people are broadly excluded from the country’s policy documents. It is 
important to note from the outset that this differs significantly to the policy arrangements in 
Singaporean which hosts a similar ethnic mix and was once part of the Malaysia Federation. 
Singapore nation-building was premised on egalitarian multiculturalism and no single language 
from any ethnic group was codified as the nation’s official language, leading to the introduction 
of English as an inclusive and ideologically neutral lingua franca (Noor & Leong, 2013). In 
Malaysia, Articles 3 and 152 of the Federal Constitution define Malaysia as Islamic whereby 
national linguistic unity will be achieved with Bahasa Melayu as the official language for 
government and public office (Government of Malaysia, 1957). On one hand, this would give 
an advantage to the Malay majority who possess lower proficiency in English as compared to 
the Chinese and Indian minorities. Thus, balancing language policy in favour of the Malays 
would rectify inequalities (David & Govindasamy, 2005).  
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However, a more critical perspective shows that stronger ideological forces are at play. 
Malay ethnic identity, of which Bahasa Melayu is the corresponding language, is so intimately 
connected to or even synonymous with being Muslim that ethnic identity is commonly 
inseparable from religious identity (Frith, 2000). This means that being Malay and by default 
Malay-speaking is being Muslim. As Malaysia has codified the religion of the Malays as the 
official religion of the country, a logical consequence has been to codify Bahasa Melayu as 
well as the corresponding official language. This also explains why Jawi (Bahasa Melayu 
written by using Arabic script), which was the norm before European colonisation, is still 
taught in Malaysian government schools in order to ensure access to at least reciting the Qur’an 
in its original form even if reading comprehension in Arabic is limited. Fenton (2003) explains 
that making Islam the state religion serves to appease the socio-psychological interests of the 
Malay in a context of superdiversity. However, Islam is seemingly heralded as the superior 
natural state for humanity, given Malays are deemed by law to be Muslim by birth and apostasy 
is either illegal or impossible (Adil, 2007). Although freedom of religion is provided in the 
constitution alongside Islam as the state religion, Fenton (2003) argues that Islam nonetheless 
enjoys primacy in public life because it is the tradition of the Malays. The primacy of Islam 
seems to currently be resurging with a renewed wave of Islamisation in Malay-dominant 
politics. For example, the Malaysian government recently introduced the Malaysian Syariah 
Index Report to measure the compliance of Malaysia’s policies and laws with Islamic standards 
(Rahim, 2016) and Islam is commonly used in political speeches to justify national policy 
(Ghazali, 2014). Debates continue as to whether Malaysia is a de jure or de facto Islamic state 
(Fernando, 2006; Martinez, 2004) and even non-Islamic schools are forbidden from teaching 
human evolution as this is deemed contrary to Islamic principles (Joseph, 2005). By heralding 
Islam as the founding moral structure of the contemporary Malaysian state where the language 
of the local Malay directly corresponds to that religion, Bahasa Melayu was accelerated to the 
top of the linguistic hierarchy to define and unite contemporary Malaysians of all 
ethnolinguistic groups.  
 
 However, it is also the Malay identity as Bumiputera that justifies codifying of Bahasa 
Melayu. The Malaysian’ response to managing its ethnolinguistic diversity has been to stratify 
Malaysians as native or as migrants, even in the case of the well-established Chinese and Indian 
diasporas. The Federal Constitution secures the Malays’ special rights and privileges on the 
basis that Malays are indigenous to Malaysia, and this has amounted to socioeconomic benefits 
in tax, employment, and education (David & Govindasamy, 2005; Noor & Leong, 2013). While 
the non-Malays were granted Malaysian citizenship when the state was formed, Malaysian 
political discourse continues to position the Chinese and Indians as pendatang (immigrants) 
and therefore less deserving of the socioeconomic privileges enjoyed by the Malays (Frith, 
2000; Yu, 2015). This conviction is so strong that Article 10 of the constitution regards calling 
citizenship, the status of Bahasa Melayu, and Bumiputera privileges into question as disrupting 
societal harmony. This societal harmony including the status of Bahasa Melayu is overtly 
oriented towards Malay interests. Therefore, it appears that Malay national ideology as it 
amounts to Islam and the Malays as Bumiputera (as opposed to Malaysian citizenship) has 
justified codifying Bahasa Melayu as the country’s only official language despite the fact that 
Malays only form a small majority in the contemporary Malaysian population. As Rappa and 
Wee (2006: 5) summarise, “this Malaysian narrative, unlike the Singapore one, explicitly 
privileges the ethnic Malays and pedestalizes the Malay language.”   
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5.0 THE ROLE OF ENGLISH IN GLOBALISATION ERA 
English has been a core influence behind postcolonial language policy in Malaysia. Upon 
attaining independence, English was the lingua franca in Malaysia. Instituting Bahasa Melayu 
as the sole national language as discussed above served not only to define contemporary 
Malaysia in Malay terms, but also to shed its British colonial legacy. English as the language 
of that legacy is a reminder of foreign occupation. Britain had successfully instituted a divide 
and rule policy in Malaysia whereby the Malays, Indians and Chinese were generally separated 
geographically and in labour (Gill, 2013; Noor & Leong, 2013). Nation-building would mean 
removing English as the domestic lingua franca, and developing the Bahasa Melayu corpus so 
that Bahasa Melayu can fill in the role English had occupied in administration and science. 
However, as English has become the language of globalisation and Malaysia’s economy has 
highly internationalised, the policy relationship with English has become vexed. Existing 
literature has already traversed Malaysia’s complex policy treatment of English in detail. This 
especially includes Gill’s contributions (2005, 2006, 2013) and Gill et al (2004) as well as 
contributions from others (Ali, Hamid, & Moni, 2011; Haque, 2003; Joseph, 2005; Mauzy, 
1985; Noor & Leong, 2013; Rappa & Wee, 2006). However, only pertinent themes are 
provided here.  
 
From May’s (2004) perspective, English creates a tension in Malaysia between the 
Global and the Local. In other words, Malaysia’s policy seeks to develop and commodify 
English language proficiency in accommodating Malaysia’s participation in the international 
marketplace while balancing a local interest to preserve Malay ethnolinguistic identity and 
avoid English from derailing investments in Bahasa Melayu corpus planning. As Gill (2013: 
3) explains, “the anxiety is that of globalisation and the hegemony of English and its impact on 
their cultural and linguistic identity” but, by the same token in countries such as Malaysia, 
English is “crucial for developing nations in this age of globalisation where there is a pull 
toward English as a much sought after commodity, at national, subnational and supranational 
levels” (p. 3). The Malaysian situation is unique in that calls are being made not just to protect 
the status of Bahasa Melayu, but to expand it and develop Bahasa Melayu into an international 
lingua franca to indeed rival the status of English. 
 
 These tensions are visible in current political debate. The semi-autonomous state of 
Sarawak in East Malaysia under the rule of Chief Minister Tan Sri Adenan Satem declared 
English to be co-official with Bahasa Melayu in November 2015. Ministers in the Sarawak 
government explained that “we must be fluent not only in BM [Bahasa Melayu], but also in 
English” and that “English is not just the language of the Western people but is used all over 
the world” (Borneo Post Online, 2015). In response, the Chief Minister has been described as 
unpatriotic. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak has reiterated that Bahasa Melayu will be 
defended as the language of Malaysia as it is the language of the Malay race (Malay Mail 
Online, 2016b). Beyond defending the Local (in ethnocratic terms reminiscent of earlier 
discussion in this paper), the Prime Minister then proceeded to propose a language policy 
whereby Bahasa Melayu will obtain a comparable international status to English. He argued 
that “we should make full use of all the room and opportunities available to jointly expand 
Bahasa Melayu to non-native speakers,” so that Malaysia can “internationalise Bahasa Melayu 
as a world language,” and also explained that “the government had established a number of 
Chairs in Malay Studies in universities abroad as a collaborative effort to study other 
approaches to expand the use of Bahasa Melayu in foreign countries” (Malay Mail Online, 
2016b). This is perceivably a response to the rise of English in Malaysia and at the same time, 
it may also be relevant to the first of Spolsky’s factors i.e. national identity and ideology in so 
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far as Bahasa Melayu was once an important lingua franca for trade in the region (with its 
immediate neighbours) prior to and during the Dutch-colonial rule from 1641 (Ostler, 2005).  
 
 However, the tension with English is most pronounced in respect to planning the 
Malaysian school curriculum. At the outset of independence, Malaysia had phased out its 
English-medium schools and all education would be delivered in Bahasa Melayu as the instated 
national language. Since that time, successive governments have required and then banned the 
teaching of mathematics and science in English at schools and at universities (Gill, 2005; Gill 
et al., 2004). During an era of eager nationalism to define Malaysia’s society in law in Malay 
terms, the move to English in 2001 reflected challenges being faced in Bahasa Melayu corpus 
planning. English had become well-established as the language of science and technology 
whereas Bahasa Melayu would require corpus planning investment to expand its vocabulary in 
these domains in order for the language to be used as a medium of instruction in mathematics 
and science. Above all, however, the shift reflected Malaysia’s recognition that English is the 
global language of science and technology. In 2012, the policy was then reversed, with the 
government claiming that mathematics and science through English “was not carried out as 
desired. Studies also disclosed that pupils found it difficult to learn mathematics and science in 
English as they were not proficient in the English Language” (Ministry of Education Malaysia, 
2012). However, it also seems likely that the move did not please Malay nationalists. As the 
New York times reported in Malaysian politics, “they decided to buckle under the pressure 
from the Malay nationalists who argue that by teaching students in English you are neglecting 
the position of the national language” (Gooche, 2009). Since that reversal in policy, subsequent 
concerns have been raised regarding English language proficiency and about the international 
competitiveness of Malaysians which suffer as a result of monolingual education (Ting & 
Mahadhir, 2011) and this has now prompted a softening of the policy. Now the government is 
also considering an amendment to the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (secondary education 
certificate) to require all Malaysian students to not only mandatorily pass a Bahasa Melayu and 
history exam, but also English (Malay Mail Online, 2016a). The Malaysian government seems 
to see itself between a rock and a hard place linguistically as it operates a staunchly Malay-
oriented nation-building agenda which affords primacy to Bahasa Melayu while operating 
nonetheless a highly internationalised economy which demands effective English language 
proficiency amongst Malaysians. The tension between these two interests would explain 
oscillations in Malaysian language policy on English.  
6.0 THE SOCIOLINGUISTIC SITUATION AND AN INTEREST IN MINORITY 
LANGUAGE RIGHTS 
The paper now addresses the remaining two factors in Spolsky’s theory collectively because 
the two are highly interconnected in the Malaysian context. In particular, the Malaysian 
government’s recognition of linguistic diversity within the nation-state’s borders has 
specifically been to afford some, albeit limited, language rights to the Chinese and Indian 
minorities. This contrasts, for example, to policy responses that would position the Chinese or 
Indian languages as part of the national ideological fabric or officialise their languages.  
 
 In the first instance, ethnolinguistic diversity has indeed informed government policy 
in respect to a broader nation-building agenda which means Malaysia’s linguistic diversity has 
been central to language policy deliberations. In particular, successive governments have 
attempted to unite Malaysia’s ethnolinguistically diverse communities with ideological 
proposals such as Bangsa Malaysia and 1Malaysia. Bangsa Malaysia or Malaysian Race was 
proposed by the former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad in the 1990s. It encouraged 
Malaysians to rely less on their essentialised ethnic categories for self-identification and instead 
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see themselves as Malaysians (Ridge, 2004). The policy appeared to have little success, and 
was superseded by Prime Minister Najib Razak’s 1Malaysia. This accepted that Malaysians do 
and can identify through their own ethnic, linguistic, religious and other cultural qualities, but 
1Malaysia would foster harmony among ethnicities by promoting unity, harmony, and 
government welfare assistance on the basis of socioeconomic need rather than by priorisiting 
the needs of the Bumiputera on the basis of their race (Chin, 2010). Amidst significant political 
and financial investment in these multicultural projects, language policy remained ethnocratic. 
Bahasa Melayu remained the language of the Bangsa Malaysia. It is still the only official 
language of united Malaysians under 1Malaysia but the government has recoined the 
language’s name to Bahasa Malaysia (Gill, 2013) so that it would connote national 
inclusiveness while still heralding the language of the Malays. Mandarin and Tamil as the 
lingua francas of Malaysia’s two largest ethnolinguistic minorities are not given any official or 
national status. The same applies to other non-Malay Bumiputera languages, such as Iban, 
Bidayuh and Dusun-Kadazan. As such, Bahasa Melayu remains the language of official 
government business and for public communications in recognition of Malaysia’s diversity. 
 
 Malaysia operates a limited tolerance-oriented rights approach to linguistic diversity 
(Kymlicka & Patten, 2003). While advancements are currently being made vis-à-vis the rights 
of Indigenous language speakers (UNICEF, 2016), the Chinese and Indian communities enjoy 
restricted language rights through the education system. Having acquired independence in a 
school system whereby Indian students commonly attended Tamil-medium schools and 
Chinese students commonly attended Mandarin-medium schools, government policy now 
funds non-Bahasa Melayu public schools but only at the primary school level. Secondary 
education through the public system is only available through Bahasa Melayu except for the 
policy changes vis-à-vis English discussed above. Secondary schooling through a community 
language is available only privately and currently restricted to Mandarin schools funded by the 
Malaysian Chinese community. The government however, does not recognise graduates from 
Mandarin-medium secondary schools and they therefore do not qualify for entry to Malaysian 
public universities.  
 
 As in the case of Iceland when Spolsky’s theory was applied and tested (Albury, 2015), 
Malaysian policy sooner seeks to protect the rights of Bahasa Melayu speakers as they form 
the population’s majority instead of addressing the linguistic interests of minority communities. 
This paper’s discussions about the role of national identity and ideology in informing language 
policy explained that the Malaysian constitution codifies Malay cultural values, including 
Bahasa Melayu, as the defining characters of contemporary Malaysia to ensure and uphold the 
rights and privileges of Bumiputera as the first peoples of now superdiverse Malaysia. In other 
words, constitutional law has already determined that being Malay and speaking Bahasa 
Melayu will qualify for more rights than being non-Malay and speaking non-Malay languages 
as to ensure the Bumiputera status is protected. 
7.0 CONCLUSION  
By drawing on existing scholarship as well as on political discourses and policy documents, 
this paper has framed Malaysia’s national language policy in international theoretical terms. 
This is not to generalise the Malaysia’s policy situation. Without doubt, the situation is 
uniquely Malaysian and the language policies of Malaysia’s successive governments since 
independence have juggled competing and locally nuanced ethnolinguistic, political, nation-
building and economic interests and demands. Nonetheless, this paper has presented 
Malaysia’s language policy narrative through Spolsky’s (2004) theory of national language 
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policies operated by contemporary nation-states, and in doing so it tested how applicable 
Spolsky’s theory is to explain the Malaysian situation.  
 
It indeed appears that Spolsky’s theory captures the core motivations that have driven 
Malaysia’s language policy. In the Malaysian context where ethnolinguistic diversity and 
national building have been core policy priorities, national ideology and identity as well as the 
international role of English have been central concerns in language policy development. As 
this paper has argued, constitutional provisions herald and protect Malay culture and religion 
on the basis these are Indigenous and should therefore define contemporary Malaysia vis-à-vis 
its own domestic diversity. This means the sociolinguistic situation and language rights have 
concerned the Malaysian government but are being addressed through Malay-oriented 
ethnocratic policy. Accordingly, it is specifically Malay national ideology and identity, and not 
those of the sizeable Chinese, Indian, and non-Malay Indigenous minorities, that have 
influenced the Malaysian law which codifies only Bahasa Melayu as the defining language of 
Malaysia. The international prominence and local economic importance of English have 
created friction in national language policy. As an international market, Malaysia on one hand 
embraces the opportunities it sees as inherent to English language proficiency as evidenced by 
the strong position of English in the Malaysian school curriculum. On the other hand, English 
is perceived as challenging the status of Bahasa Melayu both in terms of the local linguistic 
identity it maintains as well as Malaysia’s policy goal to develop Bahasa Melayu into an 
international lingua franca. Accordingly, little space has been left in policy to address 
ethnolinguistic diversity more holistically. While the state recognises the significant linguistic 
and cultural diversity Malaysia is home to, its approach has been to propose linguistic unity 
through Bahasa Melayu. Language rights are mostly restricted to the government-funded 
Mandarin and Tamil-medium primary schools with the expectation that students will transition 
onto monolingual Bahasa Melayu education at the secondary level.  
 
Above all, the paper has served to position Malaysia’s national language policy in 
theoretical terms familiar to existing international scholarship. This is not to disregard the 
important postmodern turn in applied linguistics that promotes grassroots language policy 
research with its reconceptualisation of who does language policy and where. Instead, this 
paper has argued that national language policies as they are created and implemented by 
governments remain pertinent fields of inquiry as they are responsible for determining a 
nation’s overall legislative and political framework in regulating ethnolinguistic diversity and 
can therefore facilitate, impede, value, and devalue some languages and not others. Most 
importantly, this is not to disregard but rather to make fruitful use of the important contributions 
already made by scholars in the field of Malaysia’s language policy, sociolinguistics, and 
multiculturalism more broadly. This paper’s focus on language policy motivations rather than 
political history does however; invite for the case of Malaysia to be compared internationally 
on what drives governments to create their language policies. Having completed the current 
analysis, it is now possible to see in a comparative perspective that Malaysia appears more 
motivated to afford language rights and is more cognisant of its own sociolinguistic diversity 
than for instance, Iceland is in either regard. It also shows that Iceland and Malaysia share a 
similar vexed relationship with English as both are concerned with the relative status of their 
national languages and that both nations have turned strongly to what they see as their great 
traditions i.e. medieval literature known as the Sagas in the case of Iceland to inspire purist and 
protectionist language policy and Islam and being Bumiputera in the case of Malaysia to 
officialise only Bahasa Melayu as the national language.  
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 This paper invites further application and testing of this important theory on what 
motivations lie behind national language policies especially in the dynamic language contexts 
of Southeast Asia. For example how and why did national identity and the nation-building 
process in Indonesia lead to instituting Bahasa Indonesia as the nation’s lingua franca and how 
does this compare to other Southeast Asian nations? How does postcolonial Indochina respond 
to English in the wake of French imperialism and prestige? As Myanmar progresses on its path 
to democracy, what role will transpire for the nation’s many languages? Such research will 
allow for critical and more nuanced analyses of national language policies in Southeast Asia 
and foster a body of work whereby the national Malaysian policy narrative as traced at a high 
level through this paper can be positioned in comparative context.  
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